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Abstract
Opportunities in society are commonly interpreted as chances of
success. Within this interpretation, should opportunities be equalised?
We show that a liberal principle of justice and a limited principle of
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les should be evaluated
by means of a Nashcriterion. The interpretation is new: the social
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succeeds. In particular, the failure of even only one individual must be
considered maximally detrimental. We also study a renement of this
criterion and its extension to problems of intergenerational justice.
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If we are in politics for one thing it is to make sure that all
children are given the best chance in life1
1 Introduction
Opportunitieshave become a central concept both in the public discourse
and in economics. To model opportunities, we assume that each individual is
regarded as a binary experiment with either successor failureas possible
outcomes. Then, opportunities in society are expressed by the prole of
chances of successacross individuals. By means of this simplication, we
are able to o¤er several insights on the issue of the allocation of opportunities.
For example, what is the social cost of one person in society not having any
chance of success? Is it conceivable that such a sacrice be justied by a
su¢ cient increase in opportunities for the rest of society? In general, we
provide a theoretical framework to answer this type of question.
When in a social policy study it is claimed that some categories of indi-
viduals have low opportunities, what is usually meant is that the probabilities
- measured through empirical frequencies - of those individuals to attain suc-
cess in a certain dimension are lower than some benchmark. So it is quite
common to read statements of this kind: An adolescent of ethnic origin
X and social background Y has half the average chances to be eventually
admitted into a top university. Statements such as this link some attribute
of individuals in a group to the attainment of a desirable target simply by
looking at the objective statistical frequencies of attainment for that group.2
On this interpretation there is no mention of e¤ort, responsibilityor tal-
ent(the implicit assumption being, obviously, that they are distributed in a
similar way across the relevant groups). And politicians express themselves
openly in terms of chances. For example, beside the opening quote from Tony
Blair, in a recent major independent report [12], Labour MP Frank Field says
1Tony Blair, speech given at the Labour Party conference, 28th of September 1999.
2The literature is too vast for a comprehensive set of references. We limit ourselves to
refer to Mayers book [27], whose very title is representative: What Money Cant Buy:
Family Income and Childrens Life Chances. The meaning of the term opportunitiesin
natural language is close to the one adopted in this literature. Consider the Websters
denition of an opportunity: a favourable juncture of circumstances. Similarly, in the
Oxford Dictionary: a good chance; a favourable occasion. People with more opportu-
nities are people who face more favourable circumstances, and hence will tend to succeed
more frequently.
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that improving the life chances of under ves is the key to cutting social
inequality. On the contrary, economists have tended in the main to adopt
more sophisticated and indirect views of the concept of opportunity. Talent
and responsibility are placed at the forefront.3 It is also often taken as given
that opportunities, once properly formulated, should be equalised.
We take seriously the direct interpretation of practical decision makers.
In spite of its limitations, this approach has the advantage of interpreting
opportunities in a way that is very amenable to straightforward measurement.
A target for social policy to equalise the proportion of students in top schools
among the various ethnic groups, or the proportion in high-level jobs of
students from di¤erent types of schools, is concrete and easy to understand
and verify empirically, in a way in which, say, equalise capabilities across
ethnic groupsis not.4
Our drastic simplication yields some interesting insights in respect of
a di¢ culty with justifying egalitarian principles. Equalisation of any value
measure across individuals might always be criticised (just like simple welfare
egalitarianism) on the grounds that many individuals might have to face
large aggregate losses for the sake of increasing only marginally the value
for one individual. Our analysis, however, leads to a preference for some
degree of equality that does not stem from the nature of the equalisandum
(opportunities as opposed to welfare), but rather from outside the stock of
egalitarian principles, via a liberal principle of non-interference. The details
of this principle are explained in section 4, but its core is the requirement
that each individual in society should enjoy full control on her opportunities
when this does not a¤ect in any way the opportunities of other agents.
By means of this and other properties we characterise some Nash-like
criteria: society should, broadly speaking, maximise the product of opportu-
nities. In the usual setting of social welfare, a drawback of the Nash product
3The literature here is vast too: an illustrative but far from comprehensive selection of
contributions includes: Sen [35]; Fleurbaey [13], [14]; Herrero [18]; Bossert and Fleurbaey
[8]; Kranich [20]; Roemer [32], [33]; Laslier et al. [21]; Tungodden [37].
The contribution by Bénabou and Ok [5] does not refer to responsibility and is in this
respect closer in spirit to this paper. However, our focus is di¤erent since we attempt to
derive the desiderability of equality from rst principles.
4For example, the Deputy Leader of the British Government expresses in this way his
worry about the perceived failure of the school system: "Cleggs aides drew attention on
Monday to the fact that just over 7% of children in England go to private schools, but go on
to make up 75% of judges and 70% of nance directors." From The Guardian newspaper,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/feb/08/nick-clegg-university-access
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is that it raises a di¢ culty of interpretation: what does a product of utilities
mean? In contrast, classical criteria such as the Utilitarian and maximin
ones, for example, are clearly interpretable.5 However, in the context of this
paper the Nash product, too, acquires a transparent meaning: under the
assumption that the individuals are independent experiments, to maximise
the Nash product means to maximise the probability that everybody in society
succeeds.6
An interesting feature of the Nash criterion in a context of opportunity
proles is an extremely egalitarian implication. In fact, it is su¢ cient for
a prole to include one agent who fails with certainty for this prole to be
the worst possible one (no matter how many other individuals succeed). This
answers the question of the opening paragraph.
However, this straightforward application of the Nash criterion comes at
the cost of large indi¤erence classes: we cannot distinguish situations where
all individuals fail from situations in which only one of them fails (only weak,
and not strong, Pareto optimality is satised on the set of proles in which
some of the individuals fail). So we also formulate a new variant of the Nash
criterion, the Two-Step Nash criterion. This criterion renes the indi¤erence
classes and satises strong Pareto optimality. Nevertheless, even this variant
has a cost (from an egalitarian perspective), namely mitigating the strong
form of inequality aversion at the boundary shown by the standard Nash.
Finally, we also study situations where the number of agents is innite.
This case is relevant for the evaluation of intergenerational allocation prob-
lems. A concrete example of successfor a generation would be for example
the ability to enjoy a clean environment. At a more abstract level, in an
Aristotelian perspective, self-realisation - intended as developing human
capacities - could be taken as the fundamental objective of mankind. In this
interpretation, the probability of success of a generation is the probability
that the generation will develop its inherently human capacities. At the for-
mal level, the main novelty in this part of the paper is the introduction of
the Nash catching up and the Nash overtaking criteria. This part of the
analysis complements a voluminous stream of recent work (including Alcan-
tud [1], Asheim and Banerjee [3], Basu and Mitra [4], Bossert et al. [9]. For a
detailed survey, see Asheim [2]), and is necessarily more technical in nature.
5Provided of course that the appropriate assumptions on the comparability of the units
and origin of the utility scale are made.
6We discuss the assumption of independence in the conclusions.
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2 The framework
There are T individuals in society. An opportunity for individual t is a
number between 0 and 1. This number is interpreted as a chance of success
either in some given eld or in life as a whole,7 so that opportunities can
be manipulated just as probabilities. We are interested in how opportunities
should be allocated among the T individuals. The underlying idea is that
some (limited) resources (possibly money) can be allocated so as to inuence
the distribution of opportunities.8 An opportunity prole (or simply a prole)
is a point in the box of lifeBT = [0; 1]T , where T is either a natural number
T or 1, interpreted as the cardinalities of a nite set of agents N or of an
innite set of agents N, respectively. So, in the latter case, B1 denotes the
set of countably innite streams of probabilities of success for agents in N.
Here we develop the notation for the nite case.
A prole a = (a1; a2; :::; aT ) 2 BT lists the opportunities, or chances of
successof agents in N if a is chosen.
The points 0 = (0; 0; :::; 0) 2 BT and 1 = (1; 1; :::; 1) 2 BT can be thought
of as Hell (no opportunities for anybody) and Heaven (full opportunities for
everybody), respectively. We will also say that individual t is in Hell (resp.,
Heaven) at a if at = 0 (resp., at = 1).
Let BT+ =

a 2 BT ja 0	.9
A permutation  is a bijective mapping of N onto itself. For all a 2 BT ,
let a be the permutation of a which ranks its elements in ascending order
(well-dened since T is nite).
7Leading examples of successthat appear in the social policy literature are the follow-
ing: no teenage childbearing; not dropping out of school; attainment of x years of formal
education; attainment of fraction  of the average hourly wage, or yearly income; no male
idleness (this is dened in Mayer [27] as the condition of a 24-year old not in school and
not having done paid work during the previous year); no single motherhood. In a health
context, success may be dened, for instance, by: surviving until age y; surviving a given
operation; (for a group) mortality and morbidity below percentage  of a reference groups
average. In a social psychology context, success may be related to reported happiness being
within a certain quantile of the population. And so on.
8See Mayer [27] for an interesting counterpoint to the e¤ect of money on childrens life
chances.
9Vector notation: for all a; b 2 BT we write a  b to mean at  bt, for all t 2 N ; a >
b to mean a  b and a 6= b; and a b to mean at > bt, for all t 2 N .
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3 Opportunities in the box of life: nite so-
cieties
We aim to specify desirable properties for a social opportunity relation <S
on the box of life BT .10
Two properties for <S are the following, for all a; b 2 BT :
Strong Pareto Optimality: a > b ) a S b:
Anonymity: a = b for some permutation  ) a S b.
These properties are standard and will not be discussed further. For
future reference, we dene some possible relations on the box of life.11
For all a; b 2 BT , the Nash social opportunity ordering <N aggre-
gates chances of success by multiplication:
a <N b,
TY
t=1
at 
TY
t=1
bt:
The Two-Step Nash social opportunity ordering <2N provides a
renement of the Nash ordering on the boundary of the box of life. For all
a 2 BT , let P a = ft 2 N : at > 0g. Then for all a; b 2 BT :
a  2N b, either jP aj > jP bj;
or jP aj = jP bj &
Y
t2Pa
at >
Y
t2P b
bt.
Thus also:
a 2N b,  jP aj = jP bj &  Y
t2Pa
at =
Y
t2P b
bt
!
;
10Given a binary relation < on a set X and x; y 2 X, we write x  y (the asymmetric
factor) if and only if x < y and y 6< x, and we write x s y (the symmetric part) if and
only if x < y and y < x.
11We recall here some standard terminology. A relation < on a set X is said to be:
reexive if, for any x 2 X, x < x; complete if, for any x; y 2 X, x 6= y implies x < y or
y < x; transitive if, for any x; y; z 2 X, x < y < z implies x < z. < is a quasi-ordering
if it is reexive and transitive, while < is an ordering if it is a complete quasi-ordering. A
relation <0 on X is an extension of < if 0 and 0.
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which includes the case jP aj = jP bj = 0 and a = b = 0.12 So, the Two-Step
Nash ordering is equivalent to the standard Nash ordering in the interior of
the box of life (that is, in the case jP aj = jP bj = T ), but unlike the standard
Nash ordering it does not consider all proles on the boundary indi¤erent. If
at least one of the two proles has (at least) a zero component we count the
positive entries. If they have the same number of positive entries, we apply
Nash to them. If not, then the prole with the higher number of positive
entries is preferred.
4 A Non-Interference Principle
Imagine that success is achieved by overcoming a series of independent hur-
dles. For example, for success in becoming a doctor, being a dustmans
daughter combines hurdles that a doctors son does not face (less favourable
studying environment, lack of a high-level social network, and so on). The
addition or removal of hurdles has a multiplicative e¤ect on the probability
of success. With this interpretation in mind, the next axiom imposes some
minimal limits on the interference of society on an individuals opportunities.
We assume that an individual has the right to prevent society from acting
against her in all circumstances of change in her opportunities (due to a
change in the hurdles she faces), provided that the opportunities of no other
individual are a¤ected. By acting against herwe mean a switch against the
individual in societys strict rankings of the chance proles, with respect to
the ranking of the original proles (before the change in hurdles for the in-
dividual under consideration occurred). Crucially, the principle says nothing
on societys possible actions aimed at increasing the individuals opportuni-
ties: for example, an individual facing additional hurdles cannot demand (on
the basis of our axiom) to be compensated by a switch of societys ranking in
her favour. In this sense the principle we propose is libertarian rather than
egalitarian.13
Probabilistic Non-Interference: Let a; b; a0; b0 2 BT be such that
12We use the convention that
Q
t2Pa at =
Q
t2P b bt = 1 when P
a = P b = ?.
13In Mariotti and Veneziani [24], we explore a more radical formalisation of the principle,
applied not to chances but to welfare levels, in which the no harmconclusion follows even
when the reduction in welfare is not proportional. This leads to the leximin principle.
From a philosophical viewpoint, we interpret this principle as an incarnation of J.S.
Mills Harm Principle. We dwell on philosophical issues in Veneziani and Mariotti [38].
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a S b and, for some t 2 N and for some  > 0,
a0t =   at;
b0t =   bt;
aj = a
0
j for all j 6= t;
bj = b
0
j for all j 6= t:
Then b0 S a0 whenever a0t > b0t.
In other words, when comparing for example two pairs of proles in-
terpreted as involving losses of opportunities for only individual t from an
initial situation a; b to a nal situation a0; b0 as described, there are three
possibilities:
 Individual t is compensated for her loss (society abandons the strict
preference for ts lower-chances prole).
 Individual t is not harmed further beyond the given opportunity dam-
age (society prefers always the lower-chances or always the higher-
chances prole for t).
 Individual t is punished (society switches preference from ts higher
chances prole to ts lower chances-prole).
What Probabilistic Non-Interference does is to exclude the third possi-
bility. Societys choice should not become less favourable to somebody solely
because her position has worsened, without a¤ecting othersopportunities.
And a symmetric argument can be made for comparisons of two pairs of
proles involving increases in opportunities only for individual t.14
Note how in formulating this principle the cause of the reduction or in-
crease in opportunities for individual t (i.e. the specic hurdles that are
raised or removed) is completely ignored. It may have happened because of
carelessness or because of sheer good or bad luck. All that matters is that
the other individuals are not a¤ected by individual ts change.
14Note that since in this case too the individual cannot be harmed, the rst possibility
above in the case of harm can only consist in society switching from a strict preference for
a over b to an indi¤erence - otherwise the reverse movement from b to a would consist of
a punishment for ts improvement. This argument is made formally precise in the proof
of lemma 4 below.
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At the formal level, note that we allow for the possibility that bt = b0t = 0.
Below we also explore a version of the axiom in which we require bt > 0.
This is important from both the theoretical and the analytical viewpoint.
Theoretically, the question is whether the principle should be restricted to
situations where a damage occurs in the strict sense, i.e. where probabilities
strictly decrease. This may seem reasonable, but maybe it is not. If bt = 0,
so that an agent is already in Hell, then one may argue that the logic of
Probabilistic Non-Interference would suggest that changing social preferences
to b0 S a0 is a very heavy punishment indeed.
Note also the conclusion b0 S a0 in the statement of the axiom. The
veto power of the individual whose opportunities have changed is limited,
in that she cannot impose on society a ranking in complete agreement with
her chances. This feature becomes especially relevant if we allow <S to be
incomplete (as in the impossibility results below), for in this case b0 S a0
does not imply a0 <S b0 and thus the requirement of the axiom becomes even
weaker.
While its conceptual motivation is di¤erent, at the formal level Proba-
bilistic Non-Interference is obviously reminiscent of the standard ratio-scale
invariance property that has been used to axiomatize the Nash social welfare
ordering (we discuss the relevant literature in section 9). We stress, however,
the crucial fact that Probabilistic Non-Interference does not map strict so-
cial preferences to strict social peferences, and allows a social indi¤erence (or
noncomparability) to follow from a strict social preference after a ratio-scale
type of transformation. The full force of this distinction will be evident, for
example, in Lemma 4 below, in which the it will be shown that Probabilistic
Non-Interference implies ratio scale invariance only in conjunction with a
social rationalitytype of axiom.
Probabilistic Non-Interference rules out, for instance, the Utilitarian or-
dering. The following example demonstrates this and provides an illustration
of how the principle works:15
Example 1 Utilitarianism violates Probabilistic Non-Interference:
Let N = f1; 2g. Then  1; 1
8

is Utilitarian-better than
 
1
2
; 1
2

but
 
1
2
; 1
8

is
Utilitarian-worse than
 
1
4
; 1
2

. Yet in moving from
 
1; 1
8

to
 
1
2
; 1
8

, and from
15The Utilitarian criterion would however satisfy a Non-Interference principle in which
the change from one pair of proles to the other is not proportionalbut additive (and
thus incompatible with the independent hurdle interpretation we have given here). See
Mariotti and Veneziani [25], [26].
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 
1
2
; 1
2

to
 
1
4
; 1
2

, all that has happened is that individual 1s opportunities have
been halved, without touching the opportunities of the other individual. The
switch in social choice punishes individual 1 for the damage she has su¤ered!
5 Impossibilities
When attempting to apply Probabilistic Non-Interference - together with the
other basic requirements of Anonymity and Strong Pareto Optimality - we
are immediately confronted with a di¢ culty.
Theorem 2 There exists no transitive social opportunity relation <S on BT
that satises Anonymity, Strong Pareto Optimality, and Probabilistic
Non-Interference.
Proof : By example. Consider the proles
a = (a1; 0; x; x; :::; x) ; b = (0; b2; x; x; :::; x) ;
where 1  a1 > b2 > 0 and x 2 [0; 1]. By transitivity, together with
Anonymity and Strong Pareto Optimality, we have a S b.
Consider next the following proles obtained from a; b:
a0 = (a01; 0; x; x; :::; x) ; b
0 = b = (0; b2; x; x; :::; x)
where a01 = a1, b
0
1 = b1 = 0, for some  2 (0; 1) such that a1 < b2.
Since a1 > b1, then by Probabilistic Non-Interference, it follows that
b0 S a0. However, by transitivity, together with Anonymity and Strong
Pareto Optimality, b0 S a0, a contradiction.
Observe that this result holds for social opportunity relations which are
possibly incomplete. And even transitivity can be dispensed with, provided
that Anonymity and Pareto Optimality are replaced by the following axiom.
Suppes-Sen Grading Principle: If a > b for some permutation 
then a S b.
Corollary 3 There exists no social opportunity relation <S on BT that satis-
es Suppes-Sen Grading Principle and Probabilistic Non-Interference.
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Proof : Straightforward modication of the previous proof.
Previous impossibility results concerning the application of the Nash cri-
terion (in the context of welfare orderings) focus on the role of continuity
axioms (instead of impartiality ones such as Anonymity or the Suppes-Sen
Grading Principle). For example, Tsui and Weymarks [36] Theorem 1 states
that there exists no social welfare ordering on Rn, or on Rn+, which satises
a continuity axiom, Strong Pareto Optimality, and the standard ratio-scale
measurability axiom. A further di¤erence concerns the fact that, as noted, we
dispense with both the completeness and the transitivity of <S. And, thirdly,
Probabilistic Non-Interference is strictly weaker than ratio-scale measurabil-
ity, given that the consequent in the statement of the axiom only requires
that societys strict preference should not be reversed (which in our case al-
lows both for indi¤erence or noncomparability). It is also easy to conrm
that a weaker version of Probabilistic Non-Interference, with the restriction
 2 (0; 1) (i.e. only opportunity damageis considered), would su¢ ce for
the results.
An equivalent of Theorem 2 holds also for innite societies using Finite
Anonymity (dened in section 10) and the innite version of Probabilistic
Non-Interference below.
The result originates in the structure of the space of alternatives and
the properties of the boundary of the box of life, coupled with the fact that
Probabilistic Non-Interference applies also to proles on the boundary, and
to boundary values bt = 0. In this sense, while the impossibility is robust, in
the sense that it holds for several combinations of similar axioms (e.g. Strong
Pareto Optimality in the statement could be weakened in some ways without
eliminating the result) it does not appear to uncover any deep contradiction
between normative principles.
We shall explore two possible strategies to avoid the impossibility and
thus two alternative ways of weakening the above axioms. The rst strategy
consists of weakening Strong Pareto Optimality. For all a; b 2 BT :
Weak Pareto Optimality: a >> b ) a S b:
In order to derive our main characterisation, we need to introduce another
property.
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6 Social Rationality and the Diamond Cri-
tique
The new type of property we examine concerns the rationalityof the social
opportunity relation. Consider rst an axiom analogous to the sure-thing
type of principle underlying Harsanyis [17] defense of Utilitarianism (in a
welfare context):
Sure Thing: Let a; b; a0; b0 2 BT . If a <S b and a0 <S b0, then
8 2 (0; 1) : a+ (1  ) a0 <S b+ (1  ) b0;
with a + (1  ) a0 S b + (1  ) b0 if at least one of the two preferences
in the premise is strict.
Sure Thing is a classical independence property, and it can be justied in
a standard way as follows. Denote the compound proles a00 = a+(1  ) a0
and b00 = b+ (1  ) b0. The prole a00 can be thought of as being obtained
by means of a two-stage lottery: rst, an event E can occur with probability
. Then, if E occurs the prole is a, and otherwise it is a0. And b00 can be
described analogously, as a compound event conditional on the occurrence or
not of E. Then, when choosing between a00 and b00, it seems natural to adhere
to this decomposition: if E occurs, it would have been better to choose a00
since a is better than b; and if E does not occur it would also have been better
to choose a00 since a0 is better than b0. Therefore, a00 should be regarded as
better than b00 before knowing whether E occurs or not.
We think that a property akin to Sure Thing should be imposed but
that, as it is formulated, it displays some ethically unattractive features.
The following argument parallels the classical Diamond critiqueof the sim-
ilar property in Harsanyis Utilitarianism16 (note that a utilitarian social
opportunity ordering would satisfy Sure Thing). Consider:
a = a0 = b0 = (0; 1) ; b = (1; 0) ,  =
1
2
:
Then if Anonymity applies we have
a S b0 S a0 S b;
16See also Fleurbaey [15].
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and by Sure Thing
a00 = (0; 1) S

1
2
;
1
2

= b00:
But having one individual in Hell and the other in Heaven for sure can hardly
be reasonably regarded as socially indi¤erent to both individuals being half
way between Heaven and Hell in the box of life. As Diamond [11] would put
it, b00 seems strictly preferable to me since it gives 1 a fair share while a00
does not.17
The reason for this unacceptable situation is, obviously, that mixingop-
portunities across di¤erent individuals may produce ethically relevant e¤ects.
The problem of properties like Sure Thing, both in a utility context and in
the present one, is precisely the potentially benecial e¤ect of this sort of
diagonal mixingin the box of life.
However, the property is immune from this line of criticism when the
allowable mixings are restricted to ones that are parallel to the edges of
the box: namely, the compound lotteries only concern one single individual.
This seems to capture a position à la Diamond: I am willing to accept the
sure-thing principle for individual choice but not for social choice( [11], p.
766).
The following weakening of Sure Thing is then responsive to the Diamond
critique:
Individual Sure Thing: Let a; b 2 BT be such that a <S b and let
a0; b0 2 BT be such that there exists t 2 N such that a0j = aj and b0j = bj, for
all j 2 Nnftg, and a0 <S b0. Then
8 2 (0; 1) : a+ (1  ) a0 <S b+ (1  ) b0;
with a + (1  ) a0 S b + (1  ) b0 if at least one of the two preferences
in the premise is strict.
7 Nash Retrouvé
Before proving the main characterisation result of this section, we establish
some preliminary results, which are of interest in their own right. The rst
Lemma shows a consistency requirement implied only by Probabilistic Non-
Interference and Individual Sure Thing. The Lemma is interesting in itself at
17 [11], p.766. The notation has been adapted to be consistent with the rest of the paper.
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a conceptual level, as it helps clarify the distinction between a ratio-scale in-
variance property and Probabilistic Non-Interference. The latter implies the
former (and is otherwise weaker) only with the addition of social rationality
in the form of Individual Sure Thing:
Lemma 4 Let the social opportunity ordering <S on BT satisfy Probabilis-
tic Non-Interference and Individual Sure Thing. Let a; b; a0; b0 2 BT
be such that a S b and, for some t 2 N and some  > 0, a0t =   at; b0t =
  bt; aj = a0j for all j 6= t; bj = b0j for all j 6= t: Then: a0 S b0 whenever
either 1 > a0t > b
0
t or 1 > b
0
t > a
0
t.
The proofs of all Lemmas are in the Appendix.
The next Lemma proves that any two proles that imply Hell for at least
one individual are socially indi¤erent (we address this feature in the next
section).
Lemma 5 Let the social opportunity ordering <S on BT satisfyAnonymity,
Probabilistic Non-Interference and Individual Sure Thing. Then:
for all a; b 2 BT : [at = 0; bj = 0, some t; j 2 N ]) a S b:
Finally, the next result proves that the standard monotonicity property
is implied by the four main axioms above.
Lemma 6 Let the social opportunity ordering <S on BT satisfyWeak Pareto
Optimality, Anonymity, Probabilistic Non-Interference, and Indi-
vidual Sure Thing. Then: for all a; b 2 BT : a > b ) a <S b.
Given the previous lemmas, we can now show that an ordering in the box
of life can be completely characterised by the four axioms discussed before.18
Theorem 7 (MAXIMISE THE PROBABILITY OF HEAVEN): A
social opportunity ordering <S on BT satises Anonymity, Weak Pareto
Optimality, Probabilistic Non-Interference and Individual Sure Thing
if and only if <S is the Nash ordering <N .
18It is not di¢ cult to prove that the axioms in Theorem 7, and indeed in all character-
isation results below, are independent. The details are available from the authors upon
request.
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Proof : ()) It is immediate to prove that the Nash ordering <N satises
all four axioms.
(() Suppose that the social opportunity ordering <S on BT satises
Anonymity,Weak Pareto Optimality,Probabilistic Non-Interference,
and Individual Sure Thing. For any a; b 2 BT , we shall prove that (i)
a N b) a S b; and (ii) a N b) a S b.
Claim (i). Suppose that a; b 2 BT are such that QTt=1 at > QTt=1 bt. This
implies that a 2 BT+. If b 2 BTnBT+, then lemma 5 implies that b S 0, and
byWeak Pareto Optimality and transitivity, we obtain a S b.
Therefore, suppose b 2 BT+. Note that by Anonymity, we can work
with the ranked vectors a; b. Therefore suppose, by contradiction, that a N
b, but b S a. Dene U = t 2 Nj at > bt	, L = t 2 Nj bt > at	, and
E =

t 2 Nj at = bt
	
. Since a N b it follows that QTt=1 at > QTt=1 bt or Q
t2U at
  Q
t2L at
  Q
t2E at

>
 Q
t2U bt
  Q
t2L bt
  Q
t2E bt

, and by the
denition of the sets U;L;E, it follows that
Q
t2U
at
bt

>
Q
t2L
bt
at

> 1.
Since b S a, by Lemma 6 it must be L 6= ;. Let h = mint2L t and let
d = maxt2L t. We consider the following cases.
Case 1: h = T . Since a N b; there is at least one t 2 U; t < T , and by
construction bT > aT  at > bt. By Anonymity and transitivity, consider
a vector a which is a permutation of a such that aT = at. Then, from a
; b
construct a0; b0 as follows: let b0T = bT , a
0
T = a

T = at, and leave all other
entries of a and b unchanged.
If at
bt
 bT
aT
, let  = aT
bT
< 1. By construction a0; b0 2 BT , b0T = aT , a0T  bt,
and a0T < b
0
T < 1. Hence, by Lemma 4, it follows that b
0 S a0. However,
a0 > b
0
, and therefore by Lemma 6, Anonymity, and transitivity, it follows
that a0 <S b0, a contradiction.
If at
bt
< bT
aT
, let  = bt
at
< 1. By construction a0; b0 2 BT , b0T > aT , a0T = bt,
and a0T < b
0
T < 1. Hence, by Lemma 4, it follows that b
0 S a0. Note that by
construction b
0
T
a0T
=  bT
aT
< bT
aT
and a0 N b0. But then the same reasoning can
be iterated m   1 times until we obtain vectors am; bm such that bm S am
but am > b
m
and the desired contradiction ensues.
Case 2: d = 1. Since a N b; there is at least one t 2 U; t > 1, and by
construction at > bt  b1 > a1. By Anonymity and transitivity, consider
a vector b which is a permutation of b such that b1 = bt. Then, from a; b

construct a0; b0 as follows: let b01 = b

1 = bt, a
0
1 = a1, and leave all other
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entries of a and b unchanged.
If at
bt
> b1
a1
, let  = b1
a1
> 1. By construction a0; b0 2 BT , b01 < at, a01 = b1,
and a01 < b
0
1 < 1. Hence, by Lemma 4, it follows that b
0 S a0. However,
a0 > b
0
, and therefore by Lemma 6, Anonymity, and transitivity, it follows
that a0 <S b0, a contradiction.
If at
bt
 b1
a1
, let  =

at
bt
  "

and " > 0 is chosen so that  > 1. By
construction a0; b0 2 BT , b01 < at, a01 < b1, and a01 < b01 < 1. Hence, by
Lemma 4, it follows that b0 S a0. Note that by construction b
0
1
a01
= b1
a1
< b1
a1
and a0 N b0. But then the same reasoning can be iterated m  1 times until
we obtain vectors am; bm such that bm S am but am > bm and the desired
contradiction ensues.
Case 3: if either 1 < h = d < T or 1  h < d  T , then the proof can be
obtained with an appropriate combination of cases 1 and 2.
This proves that if a N b then a <S b. Suppose that a S b: sinceQT
t=1 at >
QT
t=1 bt then a 2 BT+. Then there exists a su¢ ciently small number
" > 0 such that a" = (a1 "; a2 "; :::; aT  ") 2 BT ,
QT
t=1 (at   ") >
QT
t=1 bt,
and so a" N b, but byWeak Pareto Optimality and transitivity, b S a".
Then the previous argument can be applied to a" and b.
Claim (ii). Suppose that a; b 2 BT are such that QTt=1 at = QTt=1 bt. IfQT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt = 1, then the result follows from reexivity. If
QT
t=1 at =QT
t=1 bt = 0, then the result follows from Lemma 5.
Therefore suppose that 1 >
QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt > 0. If there exists a per-
mutation  such that a = b, then the result follows by Anonymity. There-
fore, suppose that U =

t 2 Nj at > bt
	 6= ; and L = t 2 Nj bt > at	 6= ;.
Suppose in contradiction that a S b. By completeness, and without loss of
generality, suppose that a S b. By Anonymity and transitivity, consider
the ranked vectors a; b.
Let k = mint2U t. Take any l 2 L. Suppose that l < k. [An analogous ar-
gument applies if l > k.] By construction ak > bk  bl > al. By Anonymity
and transitivity, consider a vector b which is a permutation of b such that
bk = bl. Then, from a; b
 construct a0; b0 as follows. Let b0k = b

k = bl, a
0
k =
ak, where  =
bk
ak
< 1; and leave all other entries of a and b unchanged.
By construction a0; b0 2 BT , a0k = bk, and b0k < a0k < 1. Hence, by Lemma 4,
a0 S b0.
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Let a1  a0; and b1  b0: by construction QTt=1 a1t =QTt=1 b1t > 0 and E =
t 2 Nj at = bt
	  E1 = nt 2 Nj a1t = b1to. If U = fkg and L = flg, it is
easy to show that E1 = N , yielding the desired contradiction, by transitivity
and Anonymity. Otherwise, the previous argument can be iterated m   1
times to obtain vectors am; bm 2 BT such that am S bm, but Em = N ,
which again yields a contradiction by transitivity and Anonymity.
The interpretation of the Nash social opportunity ordering is of inter-
est. In the present framework, each individual is a binary experiment, with
outcome either success or failure. Imagining that such experiments are inde-
pendent, the ordering just characterised says that chances in life should be
allocated in such a way as tomaximise the probability that everybody succeeds.
As a particular implication, the failure of even only one individual must be
considered as maximally detrimental.
Contrast this attempt to maximise the probability of Heaven with a Util-
itarian type of ordering, which would maximise the sum of probabilities. In
the proposed interpretation, that would amount to maximising the expected
number of successes. Clearly, such a method would be biased, compared to
the one proposed, against a minority of individuals with very low probability
of success.
It is also interesting to compare the use of the Nash ordering in the present
framework to that in a standard utility framework. In the latter, there are
two problems of interpretation.
Firstly, it is not clear what it means to maximise a product of utilities (as
noted, e.g., by Rubinstein [34]19). In a welfare world the utilitarian process
of aggregation has a naturalmeaning, which the Nash product lacks. But in
a world of chances, a process of aggregation by product feels equally natural.
Secondly, the maximisation of the Nash product on the positive orthant
requires the external specication of a welfare zero. In a bargaining context,
this is assumed to be the disagreement point; but its determination in a
general social choice context is unclear, and it must be based on some external
argument. On the contrary, the structure of the box of life, with its internal
zero, makes this problem vanish.
19The formula of the Nash bargaining solution lacks a clear meaning. What is the
interpretation of the product of two von Neumann Morgenstern utility numbers?(p. 82).
The interpretation he goes on to propose is related to non-cooperative bargaining. Here
we are rather interested in an interpretation of the Nash ordering as an ethical allocation
method. A di¤erent interpretation in this vein is in Mariotti [23].
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8 The Two-Step Nash Ordering
A drawback of the Nash ordering - a consequence of relaxing Strong Pareto
Optimality - is that it yields some very large indi¤erence classes by consid-
ering all points on the boundary of the box of life as equally good (or bad).
This may be deemed undesirable from an ethical perspective, and it may be
a drawback for practical applications. For a prole where all agents (poten-
tially a very large number of individuals) are in Hell can hardly be seen as
indi¤erent to one in which only one of them su¤ers.
In this section, we explore another way out of the impossibility in which
Strong Pareto Optimality is not abandoned. This requires some adjustments
in the axiomatic system. We restrict the application of Probabilistic Non-
Interference to strictly positive probabilities (as we discussed after the def-
inition of the principle, this may be a reasonable restriction), and we also
make strict the conclusion in the statement of the axiom.
Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference : Let a; b; a0; b0 2 BT be such
that a S b and, for some t 2 N and for some  > 0,
a0t =   at;
b0t =   bt;
aj = a
0
j for all j 6= t;
bj = b
0
j for all j 6= t:
Then a0 S b0 whenever bt 6= 0 and a0t > b0t.
We can now state the main characterisation of this section:
Theorem 8 (MAXIMISE THE PROBABILITY OF HEAVEN AND
HAVE FEW PEOPLE IN HELL): A social opportunity ordering <S on
BT satises Anonymity, Strong Pareto Optimality, and Strict Proba-
bilistic Non-Interference if and only if <S is the Two-Step Nash ordering
<2N .
Proof : ()) It is immediate to prove that <2N satises all three axioms.
(() Suppose that the social opportunity ordering <S on BT satises
Anonymity, Strong Pareto Optimality, and Strict Probabilistic Non-
Interference. For any a; b 2 BT , we shall prove that (i) a 2N b) a S b;
and (ii) a 2N b) a S b.
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Claim (i). We need to consider three cases.
Suppose that a; b 2 BT+ are such that
QT
t=1 at >
QT
t=1 bt. Then the same
reasoning as in theorem 7 can be applied to rule out b S a, noting that in
the interior of the box of life, Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference is
stronger than Probabilistic Non-Interference.
Suppose that a; b 2 BT are such that jP aj = jP bj < T and Qt2Pa at >Q
t2P b bt: Then by focusing on the subset of strictly positive entries of a; b 2
BT , the previous reasoning can be used to rule out b S a.
Suppose that a; b 2 BT are such that jP aj > jP bj. By Anonymity and
transitivity, consider the ranked vectors a; b. Let k = min ft 2 N : at > 0g.
Note that by assumption, ak > bk = 0. Next, let l = min

t 2 N : bt > 0
	
. If
for all i  l, ai  bi, then the result follows by Strong Pareto Optimality.
Therefore suppose that bh > ah, some h  l, and, in contradiction to claim
(i), b S a. Then by Anonymity and transitivity, consider vector b which
is a permutation of b such that bk = bh. Then, from a; b
 construct a0; b0
as follows: let  > 0 be such that a0k = ak, b
0
k = b

k = bh, a
0
j = a

j
all j 6= k, b0j = bj all j 6= k, and such that b0k = bh < ah: Since h 
l > k, then b0k > a
0
k, and given that a
0
k 6= 0, by Strict Probabilistic
Non-Interference, it follows that b0 S a0. Consider the ranked vectors
a0; b
0
. Note that k0 = min ft 2 N : a0t > 0g = k. If a0 > b
0
, then the desired
contradiction follows from Strong Pareto Optimality, Anonymity, and
transitivity. Otherwise repeat the procedure (always using the k-th entry of
the ranked vectors a, a0, and so on) until the desired contradiction ensues.
The previous arguments prove that a 2N b implies a <S b. Suppose,
contrary to claim (i), that a S b. Then, for a su¢ ciently small " > 0, it is
possible to construct a prole a" 2 BT such that a"t = at   " > 0 for some
t 2 N , a"j = aj all j 6= t, and a" 2N b. By transitivity and Strong Pareto
Optimality, b S a", and the previous arguments can be applied.
Claim (ii). We need to consider two cases.
Suppose that a; b 2 BT+ are such that
QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt. The result
follows from a suitable modication of the proof of theorem 7 above, noting
that Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference is stronger than Probabilis-
tic Non-Interference for proles in the interior of the box of life.
Suppose that jP aj = jP bj < T and Qt2Pa at = Qt2P b bt. If jP aj = jP bj >
0, then by focusing on the strictly positive entries of a; b 2 BT , the same
reasoning as for the case of a; b 2 BT+ such that
QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt can be
applied to obtain the desired contradiction. If jP aj = jP bj = 0, then a S b
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by reexivity.
As the reader will have noticed, a major di¤erence between theorems 7
and 8 is the absence of Individual Sure Thing in the latter. In fact, the two-
step Nash ordering does not satisfy Individual Sure Thing, as the following
example demonstrates:
Example 9 a = ( 3
10
; 4
10
) 2N b = ( 2
10
; 6
10
) and a0 = ( 3
10
; 0) 2N b0 = ( 2
10
; 0).
However,
8 2 (0; 1) : a = a+ (1  ) a0 2N b = b+ (1  ) b0:
In fact, 8 2 (0; 1) a = ( 3
10
;  4
10
) and b = ( 2
10
;  6
10
), and thus
Q2
t=1 a

t =Q2
t=1 b

t .
This example implies immediately, together with the characterisation,
that it is impossible to impose on a social opportunity ordering <S the four
properties of Anonymity, Strong Pareto Optimality, Strict Probabilistic Non-
Interference, and Individual Sure Thing. The next result provides a direct
proof of this claim, and it demonstrates that the clash between axioms re-
mains even if one drops transitivity.
Theorem 10 There exists no complete social opportunity relation <S on
BT that satises Anonymity, Strong Pareto Optimality, Strict Prob-
abilistic Non-Interference, and Individual Sure Thing.
Proof : By example. Let x 2 [0; 1]. Consider
a =

1
2
;
1
2
; x; x; :::; x

; a0 =

0;
1
2
; x; x; :::; x

;
b =

3
4
;
1
3
; x; x; :::; x

; b0 =

0;
1
3
; x; x; :::; x

:
By Strong Pareto Optimality we have a0 S b0. Now consider two
possibilities.
If a <S b then by Individual Sure Thing
2
3
a+
1
3
a0  S 2
3
b+
1
3
b0
,

1
3
;
1
2
; x; x; :::; x

S

1
2
;
1
3
; x; x; :::; x

;
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contradicting Anonymity.
On the other hand, if b S a then by Strict Probabilistic Non-
Interference
2
3
 3
4
;
1
3
; x; x; :::; x

S

2
3
 1
2
;
1
2
; x; x; :::; x

;
again contradicting Anonymity.
Finally, we note the following related result (communicated to us by
J.C.R. Alcantud) which further claries the frontier between possibility and
impossibility:
Theorem 11 There exists no reexive and transitive (not necessarily com-
plete) social opportunity relation <S on BT that satisesAnonymity, Prob-
abilistic Non-Interference, Individual Sure Thing and the following
minimal mononicity property: there exists x > 0 for which (x; 0; 0; :::) S
(0; 0; 0; :::).
(The proof is available upon request).
9 Relation with the literature
To reiterate, the main goal of this paper is to study an operational version of
opportunities and to illustrate a new interpretation of the Nash criterion in
this context. Nevertheless, in this section we collect for the interested reader
some observations on the formal relation between our work and the literature
on the Nash social welfare orderings (SWOs).
The older part of this literature focuses on the strictly positive orthant
only (Boadway and Bruce [6]; Moulin [28]. See also Bosi, Candeal and In-
durain [7]) and as we have seen proles with zero entries create special tech-
nical problems. While still using a di¤erent domain (that of the box of life)
our setting is closer to two more recent contributions by Tsui and Weymark
[36] and Naumova and Yanovskaya [29], who explore larger domains. Apart
from the deep di¤erence in interpretation, the main technical di¤erence from
those papers is that we focus on Anonymity and in this way we do not as-
sume any continuity property, whereas continuity axioms are central in both
of those contributions. Consequently, the arguments involved are entirely
di¤erent. Notably, we do not use any results from functional analysis, nor
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properties of social welfare functions, since we cannot assume that our social
welfare ordering is representable.
To be more specic, Tsui andWeymark ([36], Theorem 5, p.252) elegantly
characterise, using techniques from functional analysis, Cobb-DouglasSWOs
(of which the Nash ordering is a special case) on Rn by a continuity axiom,
Weak Pareto Optimality and Ratio Scale measurability. Once transferred
to the appropriate domain, our ranking can be seen as the anonymous case
within this class (obtained via Anonymity instead of continuity). [36] do
not characterise SWOs similar to our Two-Step Nash ordering. Naumova
and Yanovskaya [29] provide a general analysis of SWOs on Rn that satisfy
Ratio-Scale measurability, and they do characterise some lexicographic social
welfare functions. Essentially, as compared to [36], they weaken the continu-
ity properties. For example, they focus on the requirement that continuity
should hold within orthants, which are unbounded sets of vectors whose in-
dividual components have always the same sign, positive, negative or zero
(therefore the vectors (1; 0; 1), (1; 1; 0), and (0; 1; 1), for instance, belong to
the box of life B3 but to three di¤erent orthants in the sense of [29]). The lex-
icographic SWOs characterised there di¤er markedly from ours in that they
require a linear ordering of the orthants and therefore vectors on the bound-
ary of the box of life (e.g., (1; 0; 1), (1; 1; 0), and (0; 1; 1) in B3) will never be
indi¤erent. Therefore, contrary to our analysis, Anonymity is violated.
10 Innite societies: Nash overtaking and catch-
ing up
The focus on joint probability of success seems, at the conceptual level, as
attractive an opportunity criterion when the agents are innite in number as
when there is only a nite number of them. And yet, a large set of innite
streams of probabilities yield a zero probability of joint success, making the
criterion vacuous for practical purposes.
We propose two solutions to this dilemma, which consist of adapting
two well-known methods for comparing innite streams of utilities: namely,
the overtaking and the catching-up criteria. In order to obtain the desired
extensions of the social opportunity relations, we simply add properties that
permit a link with the innite case to (analogs of) the characterising axioms
of the nite case. In this way, we obtain an overtaking version of the Nash
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criterion and a catching-up version of the Two-Step Nash criterion.
Almost without exception all uses of the Nash criterion we are aware of
apply to a nite number of agents, and therefore our proposals may be of
independent interest.20
The previous notation is extended in a straightforward way to the innite
context, with the following specic additions. A prole is now denoted 1a =
(a1; a2; :::) 2 B1, where at is the probability of success of generation t 2
N. For T 2 N, 1aT = (a1; :::; aT ) denotes the T -head of 1a and T+1a =
(aT+1; aT+2; :::) denotes its T -tail, so that 1a = (1aT ;T+1 a).
For any x 2 B, x = (x; x; :::) 2 B1 denotes the stream of constant
probabilities equal to x. Let B1+ = f1a 2 B1j1a 0g. For all 1a 2 B1 and
T 2 N, let P 1aT = ft 2 f1; :::; Tg : at > 0g.
A permutation  is now a bijective mapping of N onto itself. A permu-
tation  of N is nite if there is T 2 N such that (t) = t, for all t > T ,
and  is the set of all nite permutations of N. For any 1a 2 B1 and any
 2 , let  (1a) =
 
a(t)

t2N be a permutation of 1a. For any 1a 2 B1, let
1aT denote the permutation of the T -head of 1a, which ranks the elements of
1aT in ascending order.
We are now reasy to consider the rst innite horizon version of the Nash
criterion.
The Nash overtaking criterion: For all 1a;1 b 2 B1, 1a N 1b ,
9 ~T 2 N such that 8T  ~T : QTt=1 at = QTt=1 bt; and 1a N 1b , 9 ~T 2 N
such that 8T  ~T : QTt=1 at >QTt=1 bt.
The characterisation results below are based on the following axioms
which are analogous to those used in the nite context.
Finite Anonymity: For all 1a 2 B1 and for all  2 , (1a) S 1a.
Monotonicity: For all 1a; 1b 2 B1, 1a > 1b) 1a <S 1b.
Restricted Dominance: For all x; y 2 B , x < y ) y S (x;2 y).
Probabilistic Non-Interference: Let 1a;1 b 2 B1 be such that 1a =
(1aT ;T+1 b) for some T 2 N, and 1a S 1b; and let 1a0;1 b0 2 B1 be such that
20The only partial exception we are aware of is Cato [10], which however only considers
the Nash overtaking criterion on the strictly positive orthant.
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for some t 2 N, and some  > 0,
a0t = at,
b0t = bt,
a0j = aj , for all j 6= t;
b0j = bj , for all j 6= t:
Then 1b0 S 1a0 whenever a0t > b0t.
Individual Sure Thing: Let 1a;1 b 2 B1 be such that 1a = (1aT ;T+1 b)
for some T 2 N, and 1a <S 1b and let 1a0;1 b0 2 B1 be such that for some
t  T , a0j = aj and b0j = bj, for all j 6= t, and 1a0 <S 1b0. Then
8 2 (0; 1) : 1a+ (1  )1 a0 <S 1b+ (1  )1 b0;
with 1a+(1  )1 a0 S 1b+(1  )1 b0 if at least one of the two preferences
in the premise is strict.
Like in the nite case, Strong Pareto Optimality must necessarily be weak-
ened to avoid impossibilities: Monotonicity and Restricted Dominance are
two such weakenings that have been used in the literature (for a discussion,
see Asheim [2]).
In addition to the above axioms, a weak consistency requirement is im-
posed.
Weak Consistency: For all 1a;1 b 2 B1: (i) 9 ~T 2 N : (1aT ;T+1 1) S
(1bT ;T+1 1) 8T  ~T ) 1a S 1b; (ii) 9 ~T 2 N : (1aT ;T+1 1) S (1bT ;T+1 1)
8T  ~T ) 1a S 1b.
Weak Consistency provides a link to the nite setting by transforming the
comparison of two innite utility paths into an innite number of compar-
isons of utility paths each containing a nite number of generations. Axioms
similar to Weak Consistency are common in the literature (see, e.g., Basu
and Mitra [4], Asheim [2], Asheim and Banerjee [3]).21
Finally, the next axiom requires that <S be complete at least when com-
paring elements of B1 with the same tail. This requirement is weak and it
21Under Strong Pareto Optimality normally one needs only part (i) of the Weak Consis-
tency axiom (or similar axiom), see e.g. Asheim and Banerjee [3], in particular Proposition
2. Here we only assume Monotonicity and Restricted dominance and therefore the results
in [3] do not hold. We thank Geir Asheim for alerting us to this issue.
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seems uncontroversial, for it is obviously desirable to be able to rank as many
vectors as possible.22
Minimal Completeness: For all 1a; 1b 2 B1, 1a 6= 1b : T+1a = T+1b for
some T 2 N) 1a <S 1b or 1b <S 1a.
Before proving our main characterisation result, we state without proof
the following Lemmas which extend to B1 the equivalent results obtained
in the nite context.23
Lemma 12 Let the social opportunity quasi-ordering <S on B1 satisfy Prob-
abilistic Non-Interference, Individual Sure Thing, and Minimal
Completeness. Let 1a;1 b 2 B1 be such that 1a = (1aT ;T+1 b) for some
T 2 N, and 1a S 1b; and let 1a0;1 b0 2 B1 be such that for some t 2 N, and
for some  > 0, a0t = at; b
0
t = bt; a
0
j = aj all j 6= t; b0j = bj all j 6= t: Then:
1a
0 S 1b0 whenever either 1 > a0t > b0t, or a0t < b0t < 1.
Lemma 13 Let the social opportunity quasi-ordering <S on B1 satisfy Fi-
nite Anonymity, Probabilistic Non-Interference, Individual Sure
Thing, and Minimal Completeness. Then: for all 1a; 1b 2 B1 such
that T+1a = T+1b for some T 2 N, [at = 0; bj = 0; some t; j 2 f1; :::; Tg] )
1a S 1b:
Further, the next Lemma derives a useful implication of Monotonicity,
Restricted Dominance, and Individual Sure Thing.
Lemma 14 Let the social opportunity quasi-ordering <S on B1 satisfyMonotonic-
ity, Restricted Dominance, and Individual Sure Thing. Then: for all
1a; 1b 2 B1 such that T+1a = T+1b = T+11 for some T 2 N, 1aT  1bT )
1a S 1b:
The next Theorem proves that the above axioms jointly characterise the
Nash overtaking quasi-ordering.
22Lombardi and Veneziani [22] use minimal completeness to characterise the innite
leximin and maximin social welfare relations.
23The proofs of Lemmas 12 and 13 are straightforward modications of the proofs of
Lemmas 4 and 5, respectively, and therefore they are omitted. Details are available from
the authors upon request.
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Theorem 15 (NASH OVERTAKING): A social opportunity quasi-ordering
<S on B1 is an extension of <N if and only if it satises Finite Anonymity,
Monotonicity, Restricted Dominance, Probabilistic Non-Interference,
Individual Sure Thing,Weak Consistency, andMinimal Complete-
ness.
The proofs of the two theorems of this section are in the Appendix.
Next, we provide an extension of the Two-Step Nash criterion to the
innite context in the framework of Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [9]. As
announced, the characterisation is based on innite-versions of the axioms
used in Section 8. In addition to Finite Anonymity, we consider
Strong Pareto Optimality: For all 1a; 1b 2 B1; 1a > 1b) 1a S 1b.
Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference: Let 1a;1 b 2 B1 be such
that 1a = (1aT ;T+1 b) for some T 2 N, and 1a S 1b; and let 1a0;1 b0 2 B1 be
such that for some t 2 N and some  > 0,
a0t = at,
b0t = bt,
a0j = aj , for all j 6= t;
b0j = bj , for all j 6= t:
Then 1a0 S 1b0 whenever bt 6= 0 and a0t > b0t.
Suppose that for each T 2 N, the Two-Step Nash ordering on BT is
denoted as <2NF . In analogy with Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [9],
the Two-Step Nash social opportunity relation on B1 can be formulated as
follows. Dene <2NT  B1 B1 by letting, for all 1a;1 b 2 B1,
1a <2NT 1b, 1aT <2NF 1bT and T+1a  T+1b. (1)
The relation <2NT is reexive and transitive for all T 2 N. Then the Two-Step
Nash social opportunity relation is <2N=
S
T2N <2NT .
Theorem 16 (NASH CATCHING-UP) <S on B1 is an ordering exten-
sion of <2N if and only if <S on B1 satises Finite Anonymity, Strong
Pareto Optimality, and Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference.
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11 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have proposed formulating opportunities as chances of suc-
cess, an interpretation close to the standard use of the term by practitioners.
This interpretation is easily amenable to concrete measurement, suitable to
the formulation of social policy targets, and close to common usage in the
public debate.
We have highlighted some interesting conicts between principles and
discussed how such conicts can be overcome. We have shown that strong
limits to inequality in the prole of opportunities are implied by a liberal
principle of justice and of social rationality. Beside the inequality aversion
(concavity) of the social criterion, even only one person failing with certainty
brings down the value of any prole to the minimum possible.
The use of the Nash social opportunity ordering acquires a natural in-
terpretation in this context as the probability that everybody succeeds. Al-
though not purely egalitarian, this maximise the probability of Heavencrite-
rion is likely in practice to avoid major disparities in opportunities, as proles
involving very low opportunities for one individual will appear very low in
the social ordering. And, in the two-step renement we have proposed, Hell
should also be a sparsely populated place: that is, in practice, societies in
which opportunities are limited to a tiny elite should be frowned upon. These
partially egalitarian conclusions look stronger when one considers that they
are obtained without any reference to issues of talentor responsibility: the
conclusions are partial but unconditional.24
One feature of our analysis is that in the Maximise the probability of
Heaveninterpretation of the Nash criterion we have treated individuals as
independent experiments. Note rst that this relates only to the interpreta-
tion and not to the results themselves: the Nash criterion continues to follow
from the axioms even without independence. Secondly, at least to some ex-
tent, independence can be guaranteed by dening the notion of success in
such a way as to factor out the common variables a¤ecting success across
individuals. For example, the chances of attaining a high paying job for the
dustmans daughter and for the doctors son are both a¤ected by the possi-
24One aim of our approach is to simplify the issue of egalitarianism in a context of
social riskas much as possible, which is obtained by assuming that success is binary.
If social risk were to be considered allowing individual outcomes to be measured along a
utility scale, the denition of an appropriate concept of egalitarianism would raise many
additional thorny issues. See Fleurbaey [15] for a recent insightful contribution.
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bility of an economic recession, and must therefore be partially correlated.
To obtain independence, one might dene a high-paying job independently
for each state of nature or as an average across states. Thirdly, it seems
nevertheless of interest to consider a framework in which the input of the
analysis is the probability distribution over all logically conceivable proles
of success and failure, so as to include explicitly possible correlations, instead
of social preferences over proles of marginaldistributions. This would be
appropriate in cases where the correlation device is a relevant variable under
the control of the social decision maker - imagine for instance the decision
whether two o¢ cials on a wartime mission should travel on the same plane
or on separate planes (with each plane having a probability p of crashing).
Correlations are at the core of Fleurbaeys [15] study of risky social situa-
tions, which characterises a (mild) form of ex-post egalitarianism, allowing
individual outcomes to be measured along a utility scale, for a xed and
strictly positive vector of probabilities on a given set of states of the world.
An interesting development of our research would be to study the issue of
correlations in our framework, with variable probabilities and a restricted
range of outcomes.
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12 Appendix: Proof of Lemmas and of The-
orems on Innite Societies
Proof of Lemma 4: Let a; b; a0; b0 2 BT be such that a S b and, for some
t 2 N and some  > 0, a0t = at; b0t = bt; aj = a0j all j 6= t; bj = b0j all j 6= t.
1. Suppose that 1 > a0t > b
0
t. By Probabilistic Non-Interference and
completeness, a0 <S b0. Suppose by contradiction that a0 S b0. Consider
two cases. First, suppose that  > 1. Then consider a00; b00 2 BT formed
from a; b 2 BT as follows: a00t = 0at; b00t = 0bt; aj = a00j all j 6= t; bj = b00j
all j 6= t, and 0 > . Thus, a00t > a0t, b00t  b0t, with equality holding if
and only if b00t = b
0
t = bt = 0 (the existence of a
00; b00 2 BT is guaranteed by
the assumption 1 > a0t > b
0
t). By Probabilistic Non-Interference and
completeness, a00t > b
00
t implies a
00 <S b00. But then Individual Sure Thing
implies that 8 2 (0; 1) : a = a+ (1  ) a00 S b = b+ (1  ) b00. Note
that aj = a0j = a
00
j and bj = b
0
j = b
00
j all j 6= t, and at = at + (1  ) a00t =
[+ (1  ) 0] at and bt = [+ (1  ) 0] bt. Hence, given that 0 >  > 1,
there is  2 (0; 1) : [+ (1  ) 0] =  and therefore a = a0 and b = b0,
yielding a contradiction (note that the case b00t = b
0
t = bt = 0 makes no
di¤erence to the argument).
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A similar reasoning rules out a0 S b0 if  < 1 (the case  = 1 is obvious).
2. Next, suppose that 1 > b0t > a
0
t but, contrary to the statement, b
0 <S a0.
Suppose rst that b0 S a0. Then, consider a00; b00 formed from a0; b0 2 BT as
follows: a00t = 
0at; b00t = 
0bt; a00j = aj; b
00
j = bj all j 6= t; and 0 = 1 . In other
words, a00 = a, b00 = b (and so a00; b00 2 BT ) and since a0t < b0t, it must be
a00t < b
00
t . Since 
0 = 1

> 0 it follows by Probabilistic Non-Interference
that b00 <S a00, and since a00 = a, b00 = b the desired contradiction ensues.
Next, assume that b0 S a0. Let  > 1. Then consider a00; b00 2 BT
formed from a; b 2 BT as follows: a00t = 0at; b00t = 0bt; a00j = aj all j 6=
t; b00j = bj all j 6= t, and 0 > . Thus, b00t > b0t and a00t  a0t, with equality
holding if and only if a00t = a
0
t = at = 0 (the existence of a
00; b00 2 BT is
guaranteed by the assumption 1 > b0t > a
0
t). The previous argument implies
that a00 <S b00. But then Individual Sure Thing implies that 8 2 (0; 1) :
a = a + (1  ) a00 S b = b + (1  ) b00. Note that aj = a0j = a00j
and bj = b0j = b
00
j all j 6= t, and at = at + (1  ) a00t = [+ (1  ) 0] at
and bt = [+ (1  ) 0] bt. Hence, given that 0 >  > 1, there is  2
(0; 1) : [+ (1  ) 0] =  and therefore a = a0 and b = b0, yielding a
contradiction (note again that the case a00t = a
0
t = at = 0 makes no di¤erence
to the argument).
A similar reasoning rules out a0 S b0 if  < 1 (the case  = 1 is obvious).
Proof of Lemma 5: For any a; b 2 BT , suppose without loss of gener-
ality that T > z = jP bj  jP aj, and denote h = jP bj   jP aj. We proceed by
induction on h.
1. (h = 0) Consider a; b 2 BT and suppose that T > jP aj = jP bj =
z. If z = 0, then the result follows by reexivity. If z > 0 and there
is a permutation  such that a = b, the result follows by Anonymity.
Therefore suppose that z > 0 and there is no permutation  such that a = b.
In contradiction with the statement, suppose that a S b. By completeness,
and without loss of generality, suppose that a S b. By Anonymity we can
focus on the ranked vectors a; b where by assumption:
a = (0; 0; :::; 0; al; :::; aT ) ; b =
 
0; 0; :::; 0; bl; :::; bT

;
and z = T   l+1. Take any k such that ak 6= bk. Consider a vector a which
is a permutation of a such that a1 = ak, a

k = a1 = 0, and all other entries
are the same. By Anonymity and transitivity, a S b.
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If ak > bk, consider the vectors a0; b0 2 BT obtained from a; b as follows:
a01 = a

1 = ak = bk, b
0
1 = b1 = 0, and a
0
j = a

j , b
0
j = bj all j 6= 1. Noting
that 1 > a01 > b
0
1, by Lemma 4 it follows that a
0 S b0.
If ak < bk, consider the vectors a0; b0 2 BT obtained from a; b as follows:
a0k = a

k = a1 = 0, b
0
k = bk = ak, and a
0
j = a

j , b
0
j = b
0
j all j 6= k. Noting
that a0k < b
0
k < 1, by Lemma 4 it follows that a
0 S b0.
The same argument can be applied iteratively m times to all entries of
a and b such that ak 6= bk to obtain vectors am; bm such that by Lemma
4 am S bm, but am = bm, yielding a contradiction by Anonymity and
transitivity.
2. (Induction step) Suppose the result holds for T   1 > h   1  0.
Consider a; b 2 BT such that jP bj < T and jP bj   jP aj = h > 0. Clearly,
there exists no permutation  such that a = b. In contradiction with the
statement, suppose that a S b. By completeness, suppose that a S b. By
Anonymity, we can focus on the ranked vectors a; b where by construction:
a = (0; 0; :::; 0; al; :::; aT ) ; b =
 
0; 0; :::; 0; bl h; :::; bT

;
with l > l   h > 1. Then consider the vector a0 which is obtained from a
by setting 1 > a0l 1 > 0: a
0 =
 
0; 0; :::; 0; a0l 1; al; :::; aT

. By construction
jP bj  jP a0j = h 1 and thus by the induction hypothesis, it must be a0 S b.
Then, by Individual Sure Thing, it follows that a00 = a + (1  ) a0 S
b = b + (1  ) b, for all  2 (0; 1). However, since jP bj   jP a00j = h   1 it
must be a00 S b, a contradiction.
A similar argument rules out the possibility that b S a.
Proof of Lemma 6: 1. Consider any a; b 2 BT such that a > b.
Let Ua;b  ft 2 N : at > btg. Let Ea;b  ft 2 N : at = btg with cardinalityEa;b. By assumption Ea;b < T: We proceed by induction on Ea;b = n.
2. (n = 0) The result follows byWeak Pareto Optimality.
3. (Induction step) Suppose that the result holds for any T   1 > n  0.
Consider any pair of vectors a; b 2 BT such that a > b and Ea;b = n + 1.
Suppose, contrary to the statement, that b S a.
Case 1. Suppose there exist t 2 Ua;b and k 2 Ea;b : at 6= bk. By
Anonymity and transitivity, consider two vectors a; b 2 BT which are
permutations of a; b 2 BT , respectively, such that a1 = at, at = a1, b1 =
bk, bk = b1, and all other entries are unchanged. Then consider vectors
a0; b0 2 BT formed from a; b as follows: a01 = a1 ; b01 = b1 ; aj = a0j all
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j 6= 1; bj = b0j all j 6= 1, where  < 1, such that a01 = a1 > bt. Since
a01 6= b01 and  < 1, by Lemma 4, b0 S a0. Furthermore, let a0; b0 2 BT be
two permutations of a0; b0 2 BT , respectively, such that a01 = a0t, a0t = a01,
b01 = b
0
k, b
0
k = b
0
1, and all other entries are unchanged. By Anonymity and
transitivity, it follows that b0 S a0: However, a0 > b0 and by construction
b0k = b
0
1 = b

1 < ak = a
0
k , and
Ea0 ;b0  = n. Therefore, by the induction
hypothesis, a0 <S b0, yielding the desired contradiction.
Case 2. Suppose that for all t 2 Ua;b and for all k 2 Ea;b : at = bk.
Then consider two vectors a0; b0 2 BT formed from a; b as follows: a0t = at;
b0t = bt; for some t 2 Ua;b, and aj = a0j; bj = b0j all j 6= t, where  < 1. By
Lemma 4, b0 S a0 and since a0 > b0, the argument of case 1 can be applied.
Proof of Lemma 14: We proceed by induction on T .
1. (T = 1) Take any 1a; 1b 2 B1 such that a1 > b1 and 2a = 2b = 21.
Note that by Restricted Dominance, 1 S (b1;2 1), and so if a1 = 1, the
result immediately follows. Suppose a1 < 1. By reexivity, 1b S 1b. But
then, by Individual Sure Thing it follows that 8 2 (0; 1) : 1+ (1  )
1b S 1b + (1  ) 1b = 1b, and noting that 1 > a1 > b1, we obtain 1a S
1b.
2. (Induction step.) Suppose that the result holds for T   1  1.
Consider any 1a; 1b 2 B1 such that T+1a = T+1b = T+11 for some T >
1, and 1aT  1bT . Suppose rst that aT = 1. By the induction hy-
pothesis, it follows that (1aT 1;T 1) S (1bT 1;T 1). By Monotonicity,
(1bT 1;T 1) <S (1bT 1; bT ;T+1 1) and therefore by transitivity, (1aT 1;T 1) S
(1bT 1; bT ;T+1 1), which yields the desired result. Suppose next that aT < 1.
By Monotonicity, (1aT 1; bT ;T+1 1) <S (1bT 1; bT ;T+1 1). But then, by
Individual Sure Thing it follows that 8 2 (0; 1) :  (1aT 1;T 1) +
(1  ) (1aT 1; bT ;T+1 1) S  (1bT 1; bT ;T+1 1) + (1  ) (1bT 1; bT ;T+1 1) =
(1bT ;T+1 1), and noting that 1 > aT > bT , we obtain 1a S 1b.
Proof of Theorem 15: ()) Let <N<S. It is easy to see that <S
meets Finite Anonymity, Monotonicity, and Restricted Dominance.
By observing that <N is complete for comparisons between proles with the
same tail, it is also easy to see that <S satises Weak Consistency and
Minimal Completeness. We need to show that <S meets Probabilistic
Non-Interference and Individual Sure Thing.
To prove that <S satises Probabilistic Non-Interference, take any
1a;1 b 2 B1 such that 1a = (1aT ;T+1 b) for some T 2 N, and 1a S 1b.
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Since <N is complete for comparisons between proles with the same tail, it
follows that 1a N 1b. Then, let 1a0;1 b0 2 B1 be such that for some t0 2 N,
and some  > 0, a0t0 = at0, b
0
t0 = bt0, a
0
j = aj; all j 6= t0, b0j = bj; all j 6= t0.
We need to prove that 1b0 S 1a0 whenever a0t0 > b0t0.
By denition, 1a N 1b implies that 9 ~T 2 N such that 8T  ~T :QT
t=1 at >
QT
t=1 bt. Consider any T
0  max
n
t0; ~T
o
. Then note that 8T  T 0,QT
t=1 at >
QT
t=1 bt implies
QT
t=1 a
0
t = 
QT
t=1 at >
QT
t=1 b
0
t = 
QT
t=1 bt, for all
 > 0. Therefore 1a0 N 1b0, and since <N<S, it follows that 1b0 S 1a0.
To prove that <S satises Individual Sure Thing, take any 1a;1 b 2
B1 such that 1a = (1abT ;bT+1 b) for some bT 2 N, and 1a <S 1b, and let
1a
0;1 b0 2 B1 be such that for some t0  bT , a0j = aj and b0j = bj, all j 6= t0,
and 1a0 <S 1b0. Since <N

is complete for comparisons between proles with
the same tail, it follows that 1a <N

1b and 1a0 <N

1b
0. We show that
8 2 (0; 1) : 1a00 = 1a+ (1  ) 1a0 <S 1b00 = 1b+ (1  ) 1b0;
with 1a00 S 1b00 if at least one of the two preferences in the premise is strict.
Suppose that bT+1a = bT+1b  0. By denition, and noting that bT+1a =
bT+1b, 1a <N 1b implies that either 8T  bT : QTt=1 at > QTt=1 bt, or 8T  bT :QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt. And a similar argument holds for 1a
0 <N 1b0. By
assumption it must be
Q bT
t=1 at 
Q bT
t=1 bt and
Q bT
t=1 a
0
t 
Q bT
t=1 b
0
t. Fur-
thermore, by construction, a00j = aj = a
0
j and b
00
j = b
0
j = bj, all j 6= t0,
a00t0 = at0 + (1  ) a0t0, and b00t0 = bt0 + (1  ) b0t0. Therefore for all T  bT ,
the following holds:
QT
t=1 a
00
t = (at0 + (1  ) a0t0)
Q
t6=t0 at, and noting thatQ
t6=t0 at =
Q
t6=t0 a
0
t,
QT
t=1 a
00
t = 
QT
t=1 at + (1  )
QT
t=1 a
0
t. A similar argu-
ment shows that
QT
t=1 b
00
t = 
QT
t=1 bt + (1  )
QT
t=1 b
0
t.
Therefore if 8T  bT :QTt=1 at =QTt=1 bt and QTt=1 a0t =QTt=1 b0t, it follows
that 8T  bT : QTt=1 a00t = QTt=1 b00t . Instead, if either 8T  bT : QTt=1 at >QT
t=1 bt, or 8T  bT : QTt=1 a0t > QTt=1 b0t, holds, it follows that 8T  bT :QT
t=1 a
00
t >
QT
t=1 b
00
t . In the former case, 1a
00 N 1b00, whereas in the latter
case 1a00 N 1b00. Since <N<S, the desired result follows.
If aeT = b eT = 0 for some eT > bT , then 8T  eT : QTt=1 at = QTt=1 bt =QT
t=1 a
0
t =
QT
t=1 b
0
t = 0, and so 8T  eT :QTt=1 a00t =QTt=1 b00t = 0. This implies
1a
00 N 1b00 and the desired result again follows from <N<S.
(() Suppose that <S on B1 satises Finite Anonymity,Monotonic-
ity, Restricted Dominance, Probabilistic Non-Interference, Indi-
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vidual Sure Thing,Weak Consistency, andMinimal Completeness.
We show that <N<S, that is, for all 1a; 1b 2 B1,
1a N 1b) 1a S 1b; (2)
and
1a N 1b) 1a S 1b. (3)
Consider (2). Take any 1a; 1b 2 B1 such that 9 ~T 2 N such that
8T  ~T : QTt=1 at > QTt=1 bt. Take any T  ~T and consider the proles
(1aT ;T+1 1) and (1bT ;T+1 1). Clearly, (1aT ;T+1 1) and (1bT ;T+1 1) are in B1
and (1aT ;T+1 1) N (1bT ;T+1 1). We show that (1aT ;T+1 1) <S (1bT ;T+1 1).
Assume, to the contrary, that (1aT ;T+1 1) 6<S (1bT ;T+1 1). Minimal Com-
pleteness implies that (1bT ;T+1 1) S (1aT ;T+1 1). Let 1x  (1bT ;T+1 1) and
1y  (1aT ;T+1 1), so that 1x S 1y.
With a straightforward modication of the argument in the proof of The-
orem 7, we can use Probabilistic Non-Interference, Individual Sure
Thing, Finite Anonymity, Minimal Completeness, and transitivity
iteratively to derive vectors 1ym = (1ymT ;T+1 1), 1x
m = (1x
m
T ;T+1 1) such
that 1ymT > 1x
m
T and 1x
m S 1ym. However, by Monotonicity, we have
1y
m <S 1xm, a contradiction. We conclude that 1y  (1aT ;T+1 1) <S 1x 
(1bT ;T+1 1).
We need to show that 1y S 1x. Suppose to the contrary that 1y S
1x. Note that
QT
t=1 at >
QT
t=1 bt implies that 1aT  0. Then there is a
su¢ ciently small number " > 0 such that 1a"T = (a1  "; a2  "; :::; aT   ")
0 and
QT
t=1 (at   ") >
QT
t=1 bt. By Lemma 14, 1y S 1y  (1a"T ;T+1 1)
and therefore transitivity implies 1x S 1y. Then the above reasoning can
be applied to 1x and 1y to prove that 1y <S 1x which yields the desired
contradiction.
Since (1aT ;T+1 1) S (1bT ;T+1 1) for any T  ~T , it follows fromWeak
Consistency that 1a S 1b.
Consider (3). Take any 1a; 1b 2 B1 such that 9 ~T 2 N such that 8T  ~T
:
QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt.
Case 1. 1a  0 and 1b  0. If 9 ~T 2 N such that 8T  ~T :QT
t=1 at =
QT
t=1 bt, then eT+1a = eT+1b. Suppose, in contradiction, that
1a S 1b. By Minimal Completeness, and without loss of generality,
suppose that 1a S 1b. Fix T  ~T . With an argument analogous to the -
nite case, we can use Probabilistic Non-Interference, Individual Sure
Thing, Finite Anonymity, Minimal Completeness, and transitivity
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iteratively to derive vectors 1am;1 bm 2 B1 such that 1am = (1amT ;T+1 a) S
1b
m = (1b
m
T ;T+1 b), but there is a permutation  2  such that 1am = (1bm),
which contradicts Finite Anonymity.
Case 2. aT 0 = 0 for some T 0 2 N and bT 00 = 0 for some T 00 2 N. Take
any T  max fT 0; T 00g and consider the proles (1aT ;T+1 1) and (1bT ;T+1 1).
Clearly, (1aT ;T+1 1) and (1bT ;T+1 1) are inB1 and by Lemma 13 (1aT ;T+1 1) S
(1bT ;T+1 1). Hence, byWeak Consistency we conclude that 1a S 1b.
Proof of Theorem 16: ()) We rst prove that the relations <2NT and
2NT are nested. That is, for all T 2 N
<2NT <2NT+1;
and
2NT 2NT+1 :
To prove the former set inclusion, suppose that 1a <2NT 1b: By denition,
1a <2NT 1b , 1aT <2NF 1bT and T+1a  T+1b. Then, either 1aT 2NF 1bT and
T+1a  T+1b or 1aT 2NF 1bT and T+1a  T+1b. In either case, it is immediate
to prove that 1a <2NT+1 1b and T+2a  T+2b, and so 1a <2NT+1 1b:
To prove the latter set inclusion, suppose that 1a 2NT 1b. By denition
at least one of the following statements is true:
(i) 1aT 2NF 1bT and T+1a  T+1b
(ii) 1aT <2NF 1bT and T+1a > T+1b.
If (i) holds, then it is immediate to prove that 1aT+1 2NF 1bT+1 and
T+2a  T+2b and so 1a 2NT+1 1b.
So, suppose (ii) holds but (i) does not. If aT+1 = bT+1, then 1aT <2NF 1bT
and T+1a > T+1b implies 1aT+1 <2NF 1bT+1 and T+2a > T+2b. If aT+1 > bT+1,
then 1aT <2NF 1bT and T+1a > T+1b implies 1aT+1 2NF 1bT+1 and T+2a 
T+2b. In either case 1a 2NT+1 1b.
In sum, we have proved that <2NT <2NT+1 and 2NT 2NT+1 :
Then, using the same arguments as in Bossert et al. ([9], Theorem 1,
p.584) it can be shown that <2N is reexive and transitive, and that it
satises the following property ([9], p. 586, equation (14)):
8 1a;1 b 2 B1 : 9T 2 N such that 1a 2NT 1b, 1a 2N

1b. (4)
In order to complete the proof of necessity, we need to prove that any ordering
extension <S of <2N satises the properties in the statement.
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To prove that Strong Pareto Optimality is satised, take any 1a;1 b 2
B1 such that 1a > 1b. Let T = min ft 2 N : at > btg. By denition, 1a 2NT
1b and therefore, by property (4), 1a 2N 1b and the result follows from
<2N<S.
To prove that Finite Anonymity is satised, take any 1a 2 B1 and
any  2 . By denition of  2 , there is T 2 N, such that (t) = t, for all
t > T . Take such T 2 N. By denition of <2NT , it follows that 1a 2NT (1a),
which in turn implies 1a 2N (1a), and the result follows from <2N<S.
To prove that Strict Probabilistic Non-Interference is satised, let
1a;1 b 2 B1 be such that 1a = (1aT ;T+1 b) for some T 2 N and 1a S 1b.
Suppose that 1a0;1 b0 2 B1 are such that for some t0 2 N, and some  > 0,
a0t0 = at0, b
0
t0 = bt0, and a
0
j = aj , b
0
j = bj , all j 6= t0. We want to prove that
if <2N<S then 1a0 S 1b0 whenever bt0 6= 0 and a0t0 > b0t0.
Since <2N is complete for comparisons between vectors with the same
tail, it follows that 1a 2N 1b. Therefore by property (4), there exists T 0 2 N
such that 1a 2NT 0 1b: Without loss of generality, let T 0 = T . Then 1a 2NT
1b implies 1aT 2NF 1bT and T+1a = T+1b. If 1aT ;1 bT 2 BT+ and
QT
t=1 at >QT
t=1 bt, then 1a
0
T ;1 b
0
T 2 BT+ and
QT
t=1 a
0
t = 
QT
t=1 at >
QT
t=1 b
0
t = 
QT
t=1 bt.
If jP 1aT j > jP 1bT j, then jP 1a0T j = jP 1aT j > jP 1b0T j = jP 1bT j. Finally, if
jP 1aT j = jP 1bT j < T and Qt2P 1aT at > Qt2P 1bT bt, then jP 1a0T j = jP 1aT j =
jP 1b0T j = jP 1bT j,Q
t2P 1a0T a
0
t = 
Q
t2P 1aT at >
Q
t2P 1b0T b
0
t = 
Q
t2P 1bT bt. In all
three cases, 1a0T 2NF 1b0T and T+1a0 = T+1b0, so that 1a0 2NT 1b0 and therefore
by property (4), 1a0 2N 1b0. The result follows noting that <2N<S :
(() (The proof of su¢ ciency simply adapts the one given for the leximin
catching up by Bossert, Sprumont and Suzumura [9]. We report it in its
entirety for clarity.) Suppose that <S is an ordering on B1 that satises Fi-
nite Anonymity, Strong Pareto Optimality, and Strict Probabilistic
Non-Interference. Fix T 2 N and 1c 2 B1, and for any 1a, 1b 2 B1
dene the relation <T
1c
 BT BT as follows:
1aT <T1c 1bT , (1aT ;T+1 c) <S (1bT ;T+1 c) .
<T
1c
is an ordering because <S is. Moreover, for any 1a, 1b 2 B1,
1aT T1c 1bT , (1aT ;T+1 c) S (1bT ;T+1 c) .
The three axioms imply that <T
1c
must satisfy the T -person versions of the
axioms. Hence, using the characterisation of the T -person Two-Step Nash
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social opportunity ordering in theorem 8, it follows that
<T
1c
=<2NF :
Because T and 1c were chosen arbitrarily, the latter statement is true for all
T 2 N and for any 1c 2 B1.
To prove that <S is an ordering extension of <2N, we rst establish that
<2N<S. Suppose that 1a, 1b 2 B1 are such that 1a <2N 1b. By the
denition of <2N, there exists a T such that 1a <2NT 1b, that is, 1aT <2NF
1bT and T+1a  T+1b. Then, since <T1c=<2NF , it follows that 1aT <T1c 1bT and
T+1a  T+1b, for all 1c 2 B1. Choosing 1c = 1b and using the denition of
<T
1c
, it follows that (1aT ;T+1 b) <S (1bT ;T+1 b). Because T+1a  T+1b, either
reexivity or Strong Pareto Optimality, together with transitivity imply
(1aT ;T+1 a) <S (1bT ;T+1 b).
The proof is completed by showing that 2NS. Suppose that 1a,
1b 2 B1 are such that 1a 2N 1b. By (4), there exists T 2 N such that
1a 2NT 1b. By denition, at least one of the following statements is true:
1aT 2NF 1bT and T+1a  T+1b;
1aT <2NF 1bT and T+1a > T+1b.
In the former case, since <T
1c
=<2NF , it follows that 1aT T1c 1bT and T+1a 
T+1b, for all 1c 2 B1. Choosing 1c = 1b and using the denition of T1c, it
follows that (1aT ;T+1 b) S (1bT ;T+1 b). Then using either reexivity or
Strong Pareto Optimality, together with transitivity as in the proof of
<2N<S, we obtain (1aT ;T+1 a) S (1bT ;T+1 b).
In the latter case, since <T
1c
=<2NF , it follows that 1aT <T1c 1bT and T+1a >
T+1b, for all 1c 2 B1. Choosing 1c = 1b and using the denition of <T1c, it fol-
lows that (1aT ;T+1 b) <S (1bT ;T+1 b). Then by Strong Pareto Optimality
and transitivity, it follows that (1aT ;T+1 a) S (1bT ;T+1 b).
Therefore 2NS, which concludes the proof.
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